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Participation in Multiple-Peril Crop
Insurance: Risk Assessments and Risk
Preferences of Cranberry Growers
R. A. Dismukes, P. G. Allen, and B. J. Morzuch
To investigate the poor participation rate of cranberry growersin the multiple-peril
crop insurance program, a sample of 15 Massachusetts growers was interviewed.
According to their risk preferences, a much greater proportion of growers should have
insured, than actually did, A possible solution is to match the distribution used by the
insurer closer to that believed by the grower. Adjusting each grower’s historical yield
series for trend brought the historical and subjective mean yields much closer.
However, an aggregate test found the effect of adjustment to be insignificant, implying
that the avenu~;or-increased participation lies elsewhere.
Willingness to purchase crop insurance de-
pends on the inherent riskiness of crop pro-
duction, the grower’s risk preference, and the
size of the premium. Specifically, the pur-
chase decision is governed by how the grower
perceives the risk and how well it appears to
match the risk assessment implicit in the in-
surance coverage offered. If a farmer is suf-
ficiently averse to risk in crop income, and if
crop insurance provides risk reduction, the
farmer would be expected to participate.
In this article several potential influences on
the participation rate of cranberry growers are
examined. The study attempted to measure
the subjective risk assessments and degrees of
risk aversion of a sample of growers, analyze
the insurer’s assessment of risk and compare
it with the growers’ views, and determine the
conditions under which insurance participa-
tion would be optimal. The approach is similar
to that of Zering, McCorkle, and Moore. The
analyses differ in that Zering er af. dealt with
multicrop farms; the present study focused on
those that grow a single crop. It also put more
emphasis on the different implications of sub-
jective and historically-based yield assess-
ment.
Very few other studies have combined the
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measurement of risk and decision maker pref-
erences in order to make participation pre-
dictions. King and Oamek made normative
predictions when they used historical prices
and yields rather than subjective assessments.
Lee, Brown, and Lovejoy predicted whether
farmers would adopt minimum tillage based
on objective or subjective yield estimates and
compared the results with actual behavior, but
without eliciting the farmer’s risk preferences.
Cranberry Crop Insurance
The cranberry industry was selected for the
study because it had been the subject of a pilot
program to extend crop insurance to a wider
range of crops. The Federal Crop Insurance
Act of 1980, which eliminated the Disaster
Payments Program, proposed Multiple-Peril
Crop Insurance (MPCI) as the major form of
disaster protection for farmers. The Act au-
thorized the Federal Crop Insurance Corpora-
tion to insure producers of any agricultural
commodity, provided that sufficient actuarial
data were available. The Government sub-
sidizes up to 30!Z0of the premium payments
with the intent of covering all overhead costs.
The subsidized premium should then be
attractive to all risk neutral or risk averse
growers. MPCI was first offered to cranberry
growers in 1984. In the first year, there were
only 22 participants out of an eligible popula-
tion of about 800. In 1985, after premium rates110 Oc?ober 1989 NJARE
were substantially reduced, 66 cranberry
growers purchased MPCI (USDA).
The cranberry MPCI program works much
like those for other crops. Participation is
voluntary: each grower decides whether to
purchase insurance to cover the crop of the
coming year. For cranberries the decision
must be made in autumn for the following au-
tumn’s crop. The per acre premium, ex-
pressed in units of yield (barrels), is the pre-
mium rate offered by the insurer multiplied by
the guaranteed yield. The guaranteed yield is
defined as the grower’s average yield over the
previous ten years (initially seven years for
cranberries) multiplied by the guarantee level
selected by the grower, either 50, 65 or 759Z0 of
average yield. In dollars, the insurance pre-
mium is the per acre premium above multi-
plied by the price per barrel selected by the
grower. If as the result of an insurable event
(and not, for example, bad management) actu-
al yield falls below the guarantee level then the
grower is entitled to an indemnity. The pay-
ment is equal to the difference between actual
and guaranteed yields multiplied by the price
election.
Premium rates differ by state and by yield
class. Growers whose average yield puts them
in a higher yield class enjoy a lower premium
rate than growers in a lower yield class, al-
though the former group usually pays a larger
per acre premium. Examination of records of
the population of growers held by the Cran-
berry Marketing Committee shows that the
coefficient of variation of per acre yield de-
clines with average yield, implying that the
standard deviation is relatively unchanged
(Dudek and Allen). A similar constancy of
standard deviation has been found for corn
and soybeans (Skees and Reed). Setting a pre-
mium rate that is a fixed percentage of average
yield will lead to adverse selection. It would
encourage the lower-yielding, higher-risk
producers to purchase insurance coverage. At
the same time, insurance would be less attrac-
tive to higher yielding producers who would
be less likely to participate.
For the cranberry insurance program, the
balance between aggregate indemnities and
premiums over time is hard to determine. Its
history is brief and, because fixed premium
rates were used in the first year, the history
may be complicated by adverse selection. In
the cranberry program in 1984 $121,000 was
paid in premiums and $64,000 was paid to
growers in indemnities; in 1985 aggregate pre-
miums were $185,000 and indemnities $36,000
(USDA).
Risk Considerations and the Participation
Decision
Farmers’ subjective risk assessments may dif-
fer from historically based measures. Human
judgment relies on selective perception, se-
quential information processing, and limited
computational ability, none of which is helpful
in assessing probabilities (Hogarth). Data-
based calculations may ignore information
available to farmers, for example changes in
input rates. A few researchers have concluded
that farmers can estimate expected yields
quite accurately, finding no significant differ-
ence between actual and expected yields
(Bessler; Grisley and Kellogg). Others have
reached different conclusions. Pingali and
Carlson, and Skees found that farmers un-
derestimated yield, although no significance
tests were reported. In contrast, Lee et al. dis-
covered that all 15 of a group of growers over-
estimated income. Farmers appear to bias
towards overoptimism when assessing vari-
ability in yield. Grisley and Kellogg, Skees,
and Lee et al. observed consistent patterns of
farmers underestimating yield variability or in-
come variability. Bessler appears to have
found exactly the opposite, although the test
was on aggregated rather than individual data
and compared shapes of distributions not vari-
ances. To growers both a subjective over-
estimate of expected yield and a subjective un-
derestimate of variability work against their
insuring: the levels of protection available
appear to be too low and the premiums appear
to be too high.
Objective measures could also be flawed.
For example, if yields are trending upward a
simple moving average will lag the trended
value. The average will underestimate ex-
pected yield and overestimate variance of
yield. When such a method is used to set in-
surance rates, as it was in the cranberry pro-
gram, the rate is biased upwards, which will
discourage participation.
A grower’s willingness or ability to bear risk
also affects the participation decision. Risk
preference is commonly based on the Ber-
noullian conclusion that risk aversion can be
represented by an expected utility function,
u(x), where x is the quantity of money, in-
come, or wealth. Arrow and Pratt have de-Dismukes, Allen, and Morzuch Participation in Multiple-Peril Crop Insurance 111
fined a degree of local risk aversion, the
Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient which
is the ratio of the second and first derivatives
of the Bernoullian utility function. That is,
r(x) = – u“(x)/u’(x). For a person whose ex-
pected utility is increasing and twice dif-
ferentiable, Meyer (1977a, 1977b) has devel-
oped a criterion, stochastic dominance with
respect to a function. It allows a decision mak-
er’s Arrow-Pratt coefficient to be determined
from the decision maker’s choices among dis-
tributions of risky outcomes.
The interval method described by King and
Robison was used to bound the values of an
individual’s absolute risk aversion coefficient.
There was one important difference: the con-
text of the elicitation received more emphasis.
The distributions of outcomes shown to deci-
sion makers were also wider in the present
study. A distribution of net returns for a typi-
cal farm was divided into nine intervals of
equal probability. The midpoint value of each
area was taken as representative and the set of
nine discrete values constituted the distribu-
tion representing a given strategy. A given
pair of distributions represents equally likely
outcomes from taking or declining to take crop
insurance. The pair locates a specified bound-
ary function in risk aversion-payoff space. In
this study as in most others the boundary func-
tion is a risk aversion value that is constant
over the entire outcome range. As Meyer
points out (1977b, p. 483): “If for a particular
pair of risky prospects, F(x) and G(x), one can
find a [boundary function] k(x) such that the
conditions of this [stochastic dominance with
respect to a function] theorem hold, then this
partially characterizes those who prefer F to G
by the fact that they include all those more
risk averse than k(x). ” Also included in the
group that prefers F to G are some individuals
whose risk aversion measure varies and cross-
es the boundary within the range of outcomes.
But by assuming constant risk aversion,
agents are completely characterized. In the
above context only those who are more risk
averse than k(x) will prefer F to G. The
tradeoff for presenting a more realistic context
to the participant is that constant risk aversion
must be assumed over a much wider range of
outcomes.
Data Collection
Fifteen cranberry growers, all located in
southeast Massachusetts, participated in the
study. Growers were selected from volunteers
at a growers’ meeting and from suggestions
made by the grower liaison officer of the grow-
er cooperative. Although the sample was not
random, an effort was made to make it repre-
sentative of the locations and sizes of op-
erations in Massachusetts. Whether a grower
had ever purchased crop insurance was not
considered. Each grower was interviewed
twice with each interview taking at least an
hour.
Each grower’s subjective probability dis-
tribution of yield was extracted using two
elicitation methods in successive interviews.
At the first interview, conducted in February
or March 1985, the judgmental fractile method
(Raiffa) was used. By posing a series of ques-
tions, the range between the lowest and high-
est expected yields was first bisected into
equally likely regions. Once the midpoint was
set, the range from the lowest yield to mid-
point was bisected, then the range from the
highest yield to midpoint was bisected, and so
on until eight equally likely yield ranges were
established. At the second interview, con-
ducted in late April or May, the visual impact
method (Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker) was
used. Each grower was first instructed to try
to make assessments with the same informa-
tion that was available at the previous in-
terview. The grower was then told to allocate
chances, represented by 27 match sticks, to
nine yields that were the end-points of the in-
tervals determined at the first interview.
Each grower was asked on the first visit for
a seven-year yield history. This was used to
establish the operation’s base yield and to
place it in a risk class for insurance. If a grow-
er was unable to provide a yield history be-
yond the minimum of three years that was re-
quired to be eligible for insurance, then a yield
history was constructed by matching Massa-
chusetts annual average yields with the grow-
er’s yield in the years available and then using
this ratio to create yields for the missing years.
This method appears to be that adopted by
crop insurers to establish yields in the absence
of historical records and had to be applied to
about one-third of the growers in the sample.
Where possible, growers’ histories were ver-
ified with individual Cranberry Marketing
Committee records or with delivery records
from the grower cooperative.
Each grower’s costs of production were es-
timated at the first interview. Growers were
also asked how costs might be varied as an ex-112 October 1989
tremely good or bad yield was developing.
The grower’s assessment of cranberry price
risk was also elicited at the first interview us-
ing “the judgmental fractile method. For each
operation, data from the first interview were
later used to calculate distributions of net re-
turns. The distributions were - presented to
each grower at the conclusion of the second
interview.
Growers’ risk preferences were elicited at
the second interviews using the interval
approach described by King and Robison.
Participants were asked in a series of pairwise
comparisons to indicate which of the distribu-
tions of cranberry incomes was preferred. In
each pair of distributions one represented “in-
surance” and the other c‘no insurance, ” No
measure was made of growers’ levels of
wealth. The Arrow-Pratt coefficient was
assumed to be constant over the range of the
distribution of incomes and the utility func-
tions approximated by the exponential func-
tion, U(y) = – (exp( – ry)), where r is the
Arrow-Pratt coefficient and y is income. A
standard set of distributions was presented to
all full-time growers (more than 15 acres) and
another to all part-time growers. The incomes
in the full-time grower distributions ranged
from a lossof$114,000 to a gain of $95,000 and
for the part-time grower distributions from a
loss of $6,000 to a gain of $44,000. Each choice
the grower makes reveals a portion of absolute
risk aversion space that is inconsistent with
his or her preference. By posing successive
NJARE
choices, the space within which the grower’s
risk aversion coefficient might lie was nar-
rowed.
Results
Subjective Probability Distributions and
Yield Histories
The judgmental fractile method obtained in-
tervals over the range of all conceivable
yields. The intervals are equally likely out-
comes but every value within an interval is not
equally likely. Moments of the judgmental
fractile subjective distribution were calculated
using the midpoint of each interval (Table 1).
Since these are population probability distri-
butions, no degrees of freedom are lost in
calculating the higher moments.
The subjective distribution obtained by the
visual impact method is discrete since growers
were presented with nine specific yields and
asked to assign probabilities to each. The nine
endpoints from the first interview were used
rather than the eight midpoints because the
midpoint of the lowest interval on every grow-
er’s judgmental-fractile-determined distribu-
tions was above the highest possible insurance
guarantee level. Had the lowest midpoint val-
ue been used rather than the lowest conceiv-
able value, a grower would have no way of in-
dicating the subjective probability of a yield
below the guarantee level. No grower
Table 1. Probability Distribution of Cranberry Yields
Subjective Historical
Judgmental Fractile Visual Impact Seven Year Unadjusted
Grower Standard Skew- Standard Skew- Standard Skew-
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assigned more than three chances in 27 to
events below the 759’0guarantee level; seven
assigned one chance; five assigned none. Mo-
ments for the visual impact subjective proba-
bility distributions are shown in table 1. If the
respondents had assigned probabilities equally
to all interior values (as closely as the con-
ditions of the experiment allowed) and half of
the interior probability to each end point, then
the moments of the second subjective distribu-
tion would have been almost identical with
those of the first. Three of the 15growers were
able to achieve this consistency. Compared
with the judgmental fractile method, distribu-
tions elicited by the visual impact method
showed a higher expected yield for all but one
grower, although almost half the sample
altered expectations by less than 570. Two
growers displayed higher standard deviations
with the visual impact method, caused by
assigning a highly skewed or bimodal distribu-
tion to the given outcomes, but the large ma-
jority of respondents produced a tighter dis-
tribution with the second method.
There is no way to discover which method
more accurately described growers’ per-
ceptions of yield risk at the time that insurance
decisions were made. The time that elapsed
between interviews could also have caused
farmers to revise their beliefs, although both
interviews took place after the insurance
deadline but before the major perils to cran-
berry yields, spring frosts and insects, had
been faced. Both distributions, by suggesting
small benefit to insurance, were consistent
with nonparticipation, the most common actu-
al behavior.
A more important question in the participa-
tion decisions of growers is whether a grow-
er’s subjective yield distribution is different
from the historical record used by insurers.
Summary statistics for each grower’s seven-
year yield history are presented in Table 1. To
compare growers’ risk assessments with the
historical records a separate test was per-
formed for each grower. The subjective dis-
tribution of a grower was treated as if it were a
hypothetical distribution. A one-sided test was
used. The null hypothesis was that the seven
historical observations could have been gener-
ated by the subjective distribution. Since a
subjective yield higher than a historically
based one discourages participation, the
alternative hypothesis was that the cumulative
distribution of the actual yields lies to the left
of that of the subjective yields. Because of the
small number of historical observations and
possible skewness in the distributions, the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used (Siegel).
For the judgmental fractile method the hy-
pothesis of identical distributions was rejected
at the 5% level in 11 of the fifteen cases (Table
2).
10 assess the overall significance of the dif-
ference between a grower’s subjective dis-
tribution and the historical distribution the
grower-by-grower tests were pooled by the
method of Pearson’s Pk test (Maddala). Let pi
be the probability for the ith grower of obtain-
ing a coefficient as high as that reported given
the null hypothesis is true. Then the hypothe-
sis that there is no difference between sub-
jective and historical distributions for all
growers as a group can be tested with the
statistic: h = Z( – 2 in pJ, which is distributed
chi-square with 2k degrees of freedom, where
k is the number of independent tests. The null
hypothesis of identical distributions was re-
jected (h = 167,3; 30 degrees of freedom,
table 2).
Although subjective and data-based distri-
butions are statistically different, they may be
sufficiently similar in critical aspects. Partici-
pation should be unaffected if, first, the histor-
ical mean yield used by insurers to set the
yield guarantee level is at least as great as the
subjective mean. Second, the amount of risk
built into the insurance premiums, measured
as the variance of the historical distribution,
must be at least as small as the variance of the
subjective distribution. These one-sided tests
were conducted for each grower as one sam-
ple tests using the moments of the subjective
distribution as the parameter values. Rejec-
tion of either null hypothesis indicates a situa-
tion that discourages pai”ticipation. At the 5$27.
level, 8 of 15 growers had different means and
4 of 15 growers had different variances. Over-
all, according to Pearson’s Px statistic, the
historical means and variances were signif-
icantly different from subjective values. Test
statistics for the visual impact subjective dis-
tributions were even further into the critical
region, a reflection of the higher means and
lower variances elicited by this method.
A grower’s subjective distribution of yield is
dramatically different from the insurer’s in-
terpretation of that yield history. If the dis-
crepancy explains why few cranberry growers
have actually purchased crop insurance, then
a transformation of the data that more closely
matches the actual situation should improve114 October 1989
participation rate. One prospective transfor-
mation is an adjustment based on the trend in
individual yields.
Yield trerrd adjustment
Cranberry yields, like most other crop yields,
have been trending upward over time (Mor-
zuch et al.). As noted earlier, the insurance
program uses a moving average of an op-
eration’s yield to account for a trend. If a
trend is present, however, a moving average
will always lag expected yield. An individual
trend coefficient was estimated by regressing
each grower’s yield on time. Most of the op-
erations displayed a positive time trend, but
given the small sample of seven yield events
for each grower, the trend coefficient was sig-
nificantly different from zero (u = 0.05) in
only three of the fifteen cases. When all of the
individual tests in our sample were pooled,
however, the null hypothesis of no yield trend
was rejected by the Pearson Pi test (k =
52.02; 30 degrees of freedom). Trend coef-
ficients and summary statistics for the ad-
justed yield histories are presented in table 3.
If adjusted yield histories more closely
matched growers’ subjective distributions
then one disincentive to insurance participa-
tion would be reduced. Trend adjustments
could be made at an aggregate level, though
this would introduce another possible source
of adverse selection. In a given yield class, op-
erations with trends below the aggregate
would find insurance more attractive than op-
NJARE






Number acre/year) Mean Deviation
1 6.5 160 32.15
2 8.0 157 25.45
3 7.6 156 y~g
4 –5.2 121 46.58
5 7.2 125 38,52
6 9.3 151 22.82
7 3.4 83 10.18
8 9.4 138 32,31
9 –5.6 140 2529
10 5.0 128 15.33
11 –7.7 55 31,98
12 12.3 217 50.16
13 10.6 76 19.56
14 4.3 113 4,84
15 15.2 169 27.93
‘ Mean and standard deviation are in barrels/acre.
erations with trends above the aggregate. Al-
though trends were difficult to establish at the
individual level, each grower’s yield history
was adjusted by its time trend and the set of
tests described for the unadjusted data re-
peated (table 2). Despite the impact of trend
adjustment in reducing the discrepancy be-
tween subjective and actual means, there re-
mains overall a significant difference between
them. Also noteworthy is the overall signif-
icant difference in subjective and actual va.ri-
Table 2. Tests Comparing Subjective Distributions and Actual Samples
Subjective Distribution
Judgmental Fractile Visual Impact
Actual Yields
Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted
Individual grower tests (n = 15) Number of Hypotheses Rejected (CX = 0.05)
Same shape against actual lower 11 9 12 9
Same means against actual lower 8 4 8 3
Same variances against actual higher 4 2 7 6
Aggregate tests (df = 30) Test Statistic (X2)
Same shape against actual lower 167,3 [02.3 280.4 176.2
Same means against actual lower 113,8 77.6 136.8 94.7
Same variances against actual higher 64.8 44.7 128.7 99.5
X2(30,0.05) = 43.8
X’(30,0.01)= 50.9Dismukes, Allen, and Morzuch Participation in Mu/(ip/e-Peri/ Crop Insurance 115
antes when, in the case of the judgmental
fractile method, only two of 15 of the individ-
ual grower variances were significantly differ-
ent.
Growers’ Risk Preferences and Insurance
Participation
A grower purchases insurance to reduce vari-
ability in income rather than variability in
yield. Income variability depends on the vari-
ances and covariances of yield, product price
and costs. At least for cranberry production,
yield variability dominates. Growers saw little
opportunity to alter costs. During the first in-
terviews they indicated that their production
costs wo~ld be stable over the coming year
and that they had little ability to reduce costs
if they saw an extremely bad crop coming. All
but two growers said that total costs of pro-
duction could be reduced no more than 10% in
the event of a disaster; six growers said that
they could make no adjustment. Also at the
first interviews growers said that they saw lit-
tle price risk. Using the judgmental fractile
method almost all of the growers said that they
foresaw a range of cranberry prices that was
less than 10% of expected prices.
Cranberry growers appear to be sufficiently
risk averse to participate in an actuarially fair
crop insurance program than would reduce
risk (table 4). Ten of the fifteen growers (five
of seven part-time growers and five of eight
full-time growers) were found to be risk
averse; three growers (one part-time and two
full-time) were found to be approximately risk
neutral; two growers (one part-time and one
full-time) were found to be risk prone or pre-
ferring. If insurance premiums were sub-
sidized to offset insurers’ costs and insurers’
and growers’ risk assessments were con-
sistent, then all risk averse growers would be
expected to participate.
But, as earlier noted, insurers’ and growers’
risk assessments diverge. The final part of the
analysis explored the impact of the differing
assessments on participation. Using each
grower’s degree of risk aversion, costs of pro-
duction and expected price for cranberries,
each grower’s optimal strategy was deter-
mined (table 5). For a given probabilityy dis-
tribution of yield, if returns under insurance
(75% guarantee level; $50 price election)
stochastically dominated returns under no in-
surance for all possible values of the Arrow-




















































a Growers 1–7are part-time cranberry growers and grow-
ers 8–15 are full-time.
h 23.0 producing acres,
Pratt coefficient for a grower, the grower
would be expected to participate,
The first situation presented in table 5 is the
one that actually prevailed in 1985. Three
growers in the sample did purchase insurance,
although one of them should not have accord-
ing to his elicited risk preference. The second
situation is the expected outcome if both the
insurer and the grower had used the grower’s
seven-year yield history as the probability dis-
tribution of yield. Since it uses the 1985 pre-
mium rates and the insurer’s method of
calculating guaranteed yield, it is the result an-
ticipated by the insurer, assuming that the
Table 5. Insurance Participation Under














grower’s risk preferences have been correctly
elicited. That only about half of the samp!e
would have been expected to purchase in-
surance suggests that the subsidized rate is not
actuarial y balanced. In aggregate, farmers
will pay more in premiums than they receive
in indemnities. The subsidy was intended to
overcome this bias. The third situation is the
outcome if each grower had made an optimal
decision csing an individual trend-adjusted
seven-year history. The fourth is if each grow-
er had used the visual-impact-determined sub-
jective distribution of yield. All of the above
use the guaranteed yield calculated by the in-
surer’s moving average method.
The final situation assumes that the insurer
uses the individual grower trend adjustment to
set guarantee levels (premiums were not
changed) and the growers continue to use the
visual-impact distributions. When growers’
subjective distributions were used, the differ-
ence between their risk assessments and the
insurer’s was greatest. Changing the insurer’s
method of setting the yield guarantee levels to
individual trend adjustments made a small im-
provement in participation rate but it could
only partly overcome the impact of the di-
vergent risk assessments.
Conclusions
If our sample of growers is representative,
about half of the growers in Massachusetts
should have purchased insurance in 1985, a
much greater rate than actually occurred. Had
the insurers used trend adjusted historical
yields to set the guarantee level, a further
modest increase in participation would have
been expected, a result that conforms with the
findings of Zering et al. Trend adjustments to
cranberry yields would raise insurance
guarantee levels, increase indemnity pay-
ments, and make insurance more effective and
appealing. Use of trend adjustments might be
expected to increase the premium rate, though
calculations performed by the authors as part
of a study to revise the rate-structure indicate
that the changes in rates would be small. At
the conclusion of the second interviews, when
distributions of net returns under’ ‘insurance”
and “no insurance” options were discussed
with each grower, three of the non-insurers
expressed an interest in insuring, suggesting
that ignorance of the consequences rather
than lack of awareness of the program is a ma-
NJARE
jor reason for non-participation and this igno-
rance is more important than discrepancies in
risk assessments.
At least for the crop and location examined
here, the study casts doubt on the ability of
growers to accurately assess yield distribu-
tions. If the growers’ subjective distributions
are regarded as true, then a reasonable adjust-
ment to historical yield data, that of removing
trend, does not produce a sample that is likely
to have been drawn from the subjective dis-
tribution. The trend adjusted yields do not
appear to belong to a population with the same
mean and variance as the subjective distribu-
tion. Although after adjusting the historical
series there is a notable increase in the number
of growers with sample means and variances
not significantly different from the subjective
parameters, the improvement is illusory.
Aggregate tests show that, overall, significant
differences exist. Other studies that have com-
pared actual and subjective distributions have
not performed aggregate tests in this way and




that decision-makers can accurately
means and variances of yields and
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